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The dominant view regards weakness of will an anomaly facing the standard theory of rationality.  
The paper argues the opposite:  What is anomalous is that weakness of will is not pervasive 
enough.  In a simple model, the paper shows that weakness of will is the dominant strategy in a 
game between current self and future self.  This leads to the motivating question of the paper:  
Why is weakness of will is not pervasive—given that precommitment and punishment are not 
sufficiently pervasive to remedy the weakness of will?  The paper argues that the answer lies in 
what Adam Smith calls the “propriety” mechanism:  Humans demand self-respect and, hence, 
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  1WEAKNESS OF WILL 
 
WHAT IS THE QUESTION? 
In futuristic Britain portrayed in the 1971 classic film “A Clockwork Orange,” directed by Stanley 
Kubrick, Alex has a strong appetite for ultra-violence consisting of busting the heads of innocent 
young and old people.
2  But Alex has a stronger appetite to be out of prison.  To constrain his ultra-
violent appetite, Alex volunteers, for a shorter prison term, to participate in an experimental 
brainwashing therapy.  The experiment was successful—in fact very successful.  Once he was 
conditioned, every time the thought of violating the property of others crossed his mind, Alex 
underwent through uncontrollable revulsion, sickness in the stomach, and submissiveness.  Alex 
cannot even hurt a housefly. 
  
Similar to Alex, Ulysses and the Sirens in Homer’s Odyssey illustrates weakness of will [Elster, 
1984, p. 36].  Ulysses (Greek name, Odysseus), the king of Ithaca, was sailing back to his country 
after the Trojan War and after many years of frustrated wandering.  As the ship approached the 
island where the Sirens (half woman and half bird) live, he asked to be tied with ropes to the mast 
of the ship and to be released only after passing the island.  In such a constrained choice, he 
cannot (since he alone can hear because his shipmates' ears are plugged with wax) be lured by 
the seductive songs of the Sirens and steer the ship into the deadly rocky coast [Homer, 1977, pp. 
200-201].  Ulysses in effect deprived himself of free movement while enjoying the Sirens' song (not 
to mention that he denied such a pleasure to the shipmates). 
 
Alex and Ulysses adopt the same mechanism to combat their weakness of will:  They impose on 
themselves self-punishment.  In the case of Ulysses, the self-punishment involves the reduction of 
the budget constraint.  In the case of Ales, the self-punishment involves the lowering of utility from 
violence.  Jon Elster [1984, 2000] calls self-punishment “precommitment”.  Thomas Schelling 
[1960] calls self-punishment the offering of “hostages” which locks one in a credible behaviour in 
the future.  
  
But the idea of self-punishment does not address the basic question:  Why there is weakness of 
will to start with?  Weakness of will suggests that there is a gap between decision (i.e., the 
optimum) and the action.  What is the origin of the decision-action gap? 
  
                                                  
2 The film is based on a novel of same title by Anthony Burgess. 
  2George Ainslie [2001] explains weakness of will by invoking the idea of special discounting, viz., 
hyperbolic discounting.  That is, agents have more intense preference of today vs. tomorrow 
rewards than they do of tomorrow vs. the day-after-tomorrow rewards.  However, the idea of 
hyperbolic discounting is ultimately not an explanation but rather a description of weakness of will.  
Gary Becker [1996] advances a different explanation.  He models addiction as a habit.  As such, 
agents have weakness of will because, as a result of previous consumption, they have developed 
the taste for the prohibited good.  Again, this begs the question:  Why did the agent start 
consuming the prohibited good in the first place, especially knowing the path-dependency of the 
preferences? 
  
For a satisfactory answer, the paper offers a future-looking, rational choice model that locates the 
source of weakness of will.  Weakness of will is actually the dominant strategy between current self 
and future self.  If so, the proposed model predicts that weakness of will should be pervasive.  
Thus, the anomaly which faces the standard theory of rationality is not the evidence of weakness 
of will, as supposed in the literature.  Rather, the anomaly is the lack of the pervasiveness of 
weakness of will.  
  
This leads to the main question which motivates the paper:  Why is weakness of will not as 
widespread as predicted by the rational choice model? 
  
To elaborate, critics of standard theory have repeatedly pointed out that the weakness of will is the 
Achilles’ heel of the standard theory of rationality [e.g., Elster, 1984, 1999].  In light of the simple 
model presented here, the non-widespread of weakness of will is the actual Achilles’ heel of the 
standard theory of rationality. 
  
The proposed model is based on the common idea that weakness of will amounts to hurting the 
interest of future self, i.e., imprudence.  It is also based on the common idea that imprudence is 
analytically similar to hurting the interest of others, i.e., injustice.  Many other thinkers have drawn 
the parallel between imprudence and injustice as the outcome of prisoners’ dilemma game.  What 
is new about the proposed analysis is to establish that injustice is best understood as a special 
case of imprudence—and not vice versa. 
  
The proposed entry point of imprudence as the general case, while injustice or free-riding as the 
special case, should help us identify the source of weakness of will.  It should shift our attention 
from punishment or self-punishment (i.e., precommitment)—which is usually associated with 
injustice and free-riding—as the entry point of thinking about weakness of will.  To focus on 
  3punishment or precommitment is misleading because it cannot allow us to see that weakness of 
will is not caused by the lack of punishment. 
  
The next section, section 1, discusses further why the focus on the precommitment mechanism is 
misleading.  Section 2 sets up the question in terms of violation of the property of future self, i.e., 
imprudence.  Section 3 sets up the question in terms of violation of the property of the other, i.e., 
injustice.  Section 4 set up a simple model of weakness of will that encompasses imprudence and 
injustice.  Section 5 shows the shortcoming of three major explanations of why agents refrain from 
violating rights and behave in trustworthy manner.  In light of these shortcomings, section 6 
advances the propriety mechanism as the alternative mechanism to precommitment in abridging 
the decision-action gap.  Section 7 suggests some implications. 
 
1.    WHY IS PRECOMMITMENT MISLEADING? 
Alex and Ulysses chose what Jon Elster [2000] calls “precommitment”.  Precommitment is a 
particular kind of mechanisms which Elster defines as “constraints.” Agents adopt precommitment 
to ensure that their action corresponds to the optimum decision (in short, “decision”).   
Precommitment is a mechanism that sufficiently increases the costs or sufficiently decreases the 
utility so that it is absolutely impossible for the agent to succumb to weakness of will.   
  
Of course, the precommitments chosen by Ulysses and Alex are Draconian—which are needed 
given the colossal consequences of succumbing to weakness of will.  But in less extreme cases, 
such as abstaining from over-eating, the agent may resort to less Draconian measures such as 
locking the kitchen after dinner.  In all these cases, precommitment amounts to increasing the cost, 
or lowering the benefit, of each decision involving weakness of will so that consumer surplus would 
be non-positive. 
  
What about ex ante commitments such as the purchase of membership in a gym, when it is 
cheaper to pay per use when one decides three uses per week is the optimum?  Such ex ante 
commitments are not precommitments because the expenditures are sunk cost.  When the agent 
acts and visits the gym, historical expenditures should not matter (beyond the free entry afforded 
by the membership).  So, as defined here, precommitment is the concurrent cost of action, while 
commitment is the sunk cost which should not matter more than the sharp declaration of what is 
the optimum decision. 
  4  In this sense, precommitment vis-à-vis the property rights of future self parallels the 
establishment of “police society” vis-à-vis the property rights of others.
3   Precommitment is similar 
to placing a police guard in every aisle in the supermarket or searching the clothes of all customers 
upon leaving the store.  Precommitment is similar to telling someone a secret in order to establish 
“credible trust”—which is actually no longer trust in the sense used here but rather to establish 
“assured compliance” with the contract.  That is, the offered secret acts as a guarantor:  The teller 
of the secret assures the recipient that it is not in the interest of the teller to renege on the contract 
in the future [Schelling, 1960]. That is, the secret here acts as a hostage handed by one party so 
that the other party can be assured that it would not be deceived.  These examples—ranging from 
Elster’s precommitment to Schelling’s hostages—rob the agent of any ex post choice. 
  
In fact, the idea of “police society” as the mechanism to solve weakness of will amounts to throwing 
the baby with the bathwater.  If offering hostages or inflicting precommitment is pervasive, trust in 
human affairs is trivial.  But from casual empiricism, trust still figure highly in human affairs and 
agents do not adopt precommitments that totally extinguish temptation.   
  
For instance, let us use the stylized fact that shoplifting (or other kinds of violation of property) is 
not a widespread problem in many societies.  Further, let us use he stylized fact that agents 
everyday in such societies find the reward of shoplifting exceeds the cost (including the likelihood 
of getting caught).  So, why is stopping such agents from shoplifting?  Why is trust so pervasive?  
Precommitment cannot be the explanation.  Obviously, people do not lock themselves so that they 
do not go to stores.  Also, they generally, if not definitely, do not ask the store manager to accost 
them while shopping.  So, how can we explain trust?   
  
As one theory reviewed below suggests, agents wear “conscience” that sends painful signals if 
they do what they do not want to do.  But this begs the question:  What is the origin of conscience?  
It must be somehow related to welfare calculation.  But how exactly it is related?  So, to invoke 
conscience is simply deus ex machina explanation that begs the question. 
  
Another theory, not reviewed here, is that agents may close the gap by resorting to either self-
rationalization or self-deception.  In self-rationalization, agents may lie to themselves and pretend 
that they had no control over the action.  The prime example of self-rationalization is when Adam 
explained to God that Eve is to blame for violating the agreement.  In self-deception, agents lie to 
themselves and pretend that the decision is not optimum anyway.  The apotheosis of self-
                                                  
3 The idea of “police society” differs from the familiar term “police state” where the police is used to protect 
the current government from its critics. 
  5deception is the fable of the fox and the sour grapes—when the fox pretended that the grapes are 
sour when he failed to reach them after a couple of attempts.   
  
But it cannot be the case that all agents resort all the time to self-rationalization and self-deception.  
If these are the norms, there would be no problem to start with.  Thus, the terms “self-
rationalization” and “self-deception” would not make any sense.  To illustrate, if people are liars all 
the time, they cannot be lying and, hence, there is no meaning to the verb “to lie.”  To resort to self-
rationalization and self-deception, it must be the case that agents most of the time do not use 
them. 
  
So, how do agents make their action coincide with their decision—where the term “decision” is 
used to denote the optimum decision?  The paper argues that there is a hidden mechanism called 
“propriety” which secures that agents behave according to the optimum decision.  The decision can 
be about the optimum allocation of time between work and leisure or between self-interest and 
altruism.  The decision can be about the optimum property right.  To keep the discussion 
manageable, the decision studied here concerns only intertemporal allocation with regard to 
property. 
  
If so, there is a difference between propriety with property—despite the fact that they have, as 
Leonidas Montes [2004, ch. 4] shows skilfully, a common etymological root. As Figure 1 shows, 
propriety is a mechanism whose function is similar precommitment:  Either one abridges the gap 
between decision, which can be the property commitment, and action.   
 
 
                                                  Precommitment Mechanism 
 
 
     Decision                                                                                                     Action  
(e.g., property)                                                                                                                
 
       
                                                        Propriety Mechanism 
  
Figure 1: The action-decision Gap (weakness-of-will problem) 
  
 
  6The decision-action gap is not recognized in economic theory based on the axioms of 
revealed preference.  In fact, the term “choice” in economics came to obfuscate the decision-action 
gap—as if any choice is actually carried out.  But we need to recognize the decision-action gap if 
we want to define weakness of will, not to mention ever identify the source of weakness of will. 
 
2.   PRUDENCE—PROPERTY OF FUTURE SELF 
So defined here, prudence is the institution to which the agent is committed in order to protect his 
future self.  To illustrate, let us examine Figure 2.  The current self, and every self into the infinite 
tomorrows, gains 10 units of benefit if the self, e.g., smokes.  The self gains good health (GH) if the 
self does not smoke every day in the future.  And the self receives bad health (BH) if the self 
smokes every day in the future.  These assumptions are, without changing the conclusion, relaxed 
in the simple model offered below. 
 
                                                                                   Future Self (infinite tomorrows) 
  
Current 
Self                                         
  Smoke  Do Not Smoke 
Smoke  10;10,…; BH   10; 0,…; GH 
Do Not Smoke  0; 10, …; BH  0; 0, …; GH 
 
Figure 2: The Prudence Paradox 
  
Let us assume that future self smokes in the infinite tomorrows.  As a result the agent 
would receive bad health.  What should the current self do?  It is better off by 10 units to smoke 
today as well. 
  
Let us assume that future self does not smoke at all in the infinite tomorrows.  As a result the agent 
would receive good health.  What should the current self do?  It is better off by 10 units to smoke 
today. 
  
So, current self is better off smoking today—irrespective of what future selves do.  Here, the 
dominant strategy for current self is to smoke. 
  
If the agent applies this reasoning everyday, the agent ends up smoking everyday, and hence, 
ends up with bad health.  This is a suboptimal outcome, assuming that the agent enjoys more good 
health over the pleasure of smoking over his lifetime. 
  7  So, weakness of will is rational.  Given that current smoking has no or little effect on health, 
it is better to smoke.  But the outcome is suboptimal. 
  
So what should the agent do to nullify the dominant strategy—given the assumption that health is 
superior to the pleasure of smoking?  The possible mechanism discussed so far is self-
punishment, i.e., what Elster calls “precommitment” or what Schelling calls “hostage.”  But this is 
not the only or even common mechanism, as discussed below. 
 
3.   JUSTICE—PROPERTY OF OTHER 
As defined here, justice is the institution of fairness towards the property rights of others.  But why 
should one respect the property rights of partners?  Social contract theory, dating at least to 
Thomas Hobbes, has reasoned that property rights assure the best solution that avoids the 
suboptimal prisoners’ dilemma outcome.
4  The prisoners’ dilemma game has extensively been 
applied to public goods to illustrate how free riding leads to under-funding of public goods [Olson, 
1965] and how loafing leads to the tragedy of the commons [Hardin, 1968]. 
  
I like to apply the same idea of justice as fairness to cooperation between two partners.  Partners 
enter into a cooperative contract in order to reap the benefits of cooperation, which can be the 
increasing returns from division of labor or the sharing of the cost of a fixed asset such as an office, 
a law firm, or an apartment.  One should not take advantage of one’s roommate, business partner, 
friend, classmate, family member, marriage partner, and so on.  If one free-rides, it would result in 
the break-up of partnership and, hence, in the loss of the benefit of cooperation. 
  
Let us focus on partnership where there is no referee.  Many cooperative venues do have referees 
or arbitrators.  But to understand the function of the referee, we need first to analyze cooperative 
arrangements without referees. 
  Let us assume two friends agree to share an apartment and divide the chores of cleaning 
between them.  As shown in Figure 3, the current self, and every self into the future gains 10 units 
of benefit if the self free rides, i.e., exerts low effort of cleaning.  The agent receives bad 
                                                  
4 The Red Queen Paradox, from Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland, is probably the appropriate alternative to 
the prisoners' dilemma story.  Alice asks the red queen why she is running.  The red queen answers that if 
she stopped, she would fall behind because she suspects that the others will keep on running.  However, if 
the others likewise stopped running, she would not fall behind.  The Red Queen differs from prisoners’ 
dilemma game in one important respect.  Prisoners’ dilemma assumes that the prisoners are friends, i.e., 
have a commitment not to cheat each other.  However, this begs the question:  What is the origin of this 
commitment?  In contrast, the Red Queen Paradox is not loaded with commitment [see Khalil, 1997a]. 
  8partnership (BP) if he expends low effort in the future.  The agent gains the benefits of good 
partnership (GP) if he instead expends fair effort every day in the future. 
 
                                                                                  Future Self (infinite tomorrows) 
  
            Current 
Self                              
  Low Effort  Fair Effort 
Low Effort  10; 10,…; BP  10; 0,…; GP 
Fair Effort  0; 10, …; BP  0; 0, …; GP 
 
Figure 3: The Fairness Paradox 
 
  As in the case of prudence, the dominant strategy of current self is to free-ride.  That is, the 
agent is always better off to expend low effort in cleaning no matter what future self does.   
  
If the agent applies this reasoning everyday, the agent ends up with loafing everyday, and hence, 
ends up with losing the benefit of partnership.  This is undesirable outcome, assuming that the 
agent enjoys more the benefit of partnership than the pleasure of loafing throughout his lifetime. 
  
What to do in order to avoid taking the rational dominant strategy?  Similar to imposing 
precommitment to remedy imprudence, the agent may vote for a referee to remedy injustice.  This 
is actually the core of the analysis of Armen Alchian and Harold Demsetz [1972].  They call the 




4.  A SIMPLE MODEL 
To highlight the key assumptions, let us examine the game between “current self” and “future self.”  
Current self (at time t=0) decides whether to indulge in an action (x) that deviates (d) from the 
decision which is optimum (x*).  The action can be the consumption of food, alcoholic drinks, study, 
entertainment, work, sex, free-riding, loafing on the job, and so on.  It is assumed that if x* is 
optimum for one period, it is optimum for T periods, where t= 0, …, T.  If the agent over- or under-
indulges repeatedly, wellness would be below the optimum depending on the extent and frequency 
                                                  
5  Alchian and Demsetz explain the origin of referees and arbitration boards in disputes among business 
partners.  But this does not mean, as they claim, to be the core of the employment contract that distinguishes 
the firm [Khalil, 1997b]. 
  9of the deviation.  For instance, if one under-consumes food to an extreme degree and almost in all 
T periods, one can become anorexic.  Likewise, if one over-consumes food extremely and 
frequently, one can become bulimic.   
  




tdt)]                …        (1) 
B
t is the discount factor.  The first argument is the present value for acting according to the 
decision.  The second argument denotes the present value of excitement (E) which is positive in d.  
The third argument denotes wellness (W) which is negative in deviation (d).  In this manner, the 
opportunity cost of d is included in its impact on W.  However, the out-of-pocket cost of d can be 
negative as in the case of anorexia or TV watching instead of exercising.  But it is safe to assume 
that the out-of-pocket cost of d is zero since such cost is not the major variable in explaining 
weakness of will. 
  
In this set up, it is assumed that  
 E(dt) > |W(dt)|                …                            (2) 
that is, for any t, the excitement of the deviation from optimum exceeds the deterioration of 
wellness.  However, for the present value of all future periods, 
ΣB
tE(dt) <  |W(ΣB
tdt)|                …                         (3) 
That is, the present value of future excitements always gives lower utility than the absolute 
deterioration of wellness.  The reason for this is simple.  Wellness depends on a multiplicative 
factor of the deviations, while the total excitement is additive.  This assumption corresponds to the 
common sense observation that, e.g., a single cigarette smoking would do miniscule or even zero 
impact on health, but would give a great pleasure.  However, frequent cigarette smoking over one’s 
life time would impact health greatly.  Likewise, if one does not clean the apartment as agreed, it 
would not lead to the break up of cooperation.  But repeated injustices over time plant the seed for 
resentment on the part of the injured party.  The resentment might be suppressed for a while for 
the sake of friendship and cooperation.  But eventually the resentment will erupt unexpectedly and 
lead to an abrupt break up of the partnership.  Of course, the decline of wellness in both cases 
would vary depending on the spacing of smoking/loafing or, in general, the intensity and frequency 
of the deviations from the optimum.  But this issue should not concern us here.  
  
What matters here is that the weakness of will phenomenon is driven by a reasonable but potent 
assumption.  Namely, the injuries done to the self by smoking, or to others by loafing, are 
multiplicative rather than additive.  This feature sets the stage of why violation of the right of the 
self (imprudence) or the right of others (injustice) is the dominant strategy. 
 
  105.    THREE THEORIES OF TRUST 
Even though the violation of rights is the dominant strategy, why do agents still act in a trustworthy 
manner, i.e., respect the property rights of others and themselves? 
  
There are three possible theories of trust—other than appealing to sociological norms which would 
beg the question [Khalil, 2003].  The first theory is the modelling of integrity as a strategy:  The 
agent is simply afraid of the enormous retaliation, either by the monitor or by the self-imposed 
precommitment.  This explanation actually denies the phenomenon it tries to explain:  The agent 
cannot act in a trustworthy manner and, hence, the “police society” is necessary to monitor him in 
every step. 
  
But from casual empiricism as mentioned earlier, there is no need for “police society.”  Agents do 
act in a trustworthy manner even when the dominant strategy is to cheat.  So, the question is still 
on the table:  Why is there trustworthiness? 
  
The second theory is the modelling of integrity as a taste, i.e., as an element of the utility function.  
If so, agents with such tastes would be “stupid” in the market—i.e., act according to tastes that 
would put them at a disadvantage in the evolutionary game sense.   
  
The third theory answers this objection.  It models integrity as a character trait—what was called 
earlier “conscience”—as advanced, among many others, by Robert Frank [1987].  That is, integrity 
is a character trait that is favoured by societal selection.  People prefer to deal with agents who 
have conscience or have the honesty trait.  But this explanation begs the question, which faces all 
neo-Darwinian explanations:  From where did the trait for honesty arise? 
 
6.   PROPRIETY 
So, how to proceed?  How to explain trust, i.e., the success of closing the decision-action gap 
without extensive precommitment or living in “police society”?  How to explain the fact that agents 
do not often choose the dominant strategy of imprudence and injustice?  How to explain the fact 
that weakness of will is not as widespread as the proposed model predicts? 
 
While the current self is tempted to inflict injustice on others and imprudence on future self, current 
self often does not choose such actions.  It is not the fear of punishment because, as shown, 
loafing is the dominant strategy.   
 
  11The answer lies in the “propriety” mechanism advanced by Adam Smith [1976] in The Theory of 
Moral Sentiments [see Khalil, 1990].  The propriety mechanism highlights an alternative 
mechanism to punishment or the incentive provided by the external monitor.  The propriety 
mechanism highlights the role of the internal monitor, what Smith called the “impartial spectator.”   
 
To understand propriety, we need to dissect the physiology of the self in Smith’s theory of human 
conduct.  The self seeks self-approval and, hence, enforces commitments via self-command.
 6  To 
seek self-approval, according to Smith, current self is forced to moderate its appetites or emotions 
so that the distant self, i.e., the internal monitor, can enter and sympathize with the pleasure or 
pain of the current self.  The current self wants the support and sympathy of the impartial spectator 
who is ultimately planted in the breast of the actor.  The impartial spectator, who turns out to be the 
future self, looks at the pain and pleasures of the current self from a distance [Khalil, 1990].   
Therefore, the impartial spectator can never feel the same intensity of emotions felt by the current 
self.  And for the current self to get the approval of the impartial future self, it must lower the pitch 
of its emotions to match the view of the future self, i.e., the view from a distance.  The impartial 
future self can travel and approve (i.e., sympathize) with the current self only if the current self 
moderates its emotions.  By moderating the emotion, the current self effectively extinguishes the 
extra benefit (10 units in the above examples) it can achieve from loafing.  So, the current self does 
not see the dominant strategy as appealing as would be the case if it is not interested in getting the 
approval of the impartial distant self. 
 
But why should the current self seek the approval of the future, impartial self?  The agent reaps 
pleasure from knowing that he has conquered the immediate appetites.  At first approximation, 
there is no need for a police or external monitor.  The self seeks to monitor its own impulses 
because self-command occasions the sense of self-respect or pride.  For Smith, self-respect or 
pride can lead to vanity, self-aggrandizement, and ostentatious behaviour [Khalil, 1996].  However, 
once we look beyond the excesses, self-respect is a healthy motivation.  So, agents do not only 
seek to maximize their welfare, they also seek to maximize self-respect, one of what I called 
elsewhere “symbolic product,” afforded by self-command over immediate appetites and emotions 
[Khalil, 2000]. 
 
Thus, self-command or self-control over current excitements and appetites amounts to the 
negation of the dominant strategy.  This mechanism of self-command is not necessarily an explicit, 
                                                  
6 Thomas Schelling [1978, 1984a,b, 1992] also uses the term “self-command.”  But he actually uses it to 
denote “precommitment,” i.e., punishment that locks one in a single, predictable action.  So, Schelling’s term 
“self-command” is identical to what Oliver Williamson [1983] calls “hostages”:  Firms may invest heavily in 
brand name advertisement or fancy building to inform suppliers and customers that they would not cheat. 
  12calculative mechanism.  Rather, it occurs instantaneously as the current self seeks sympathy and 
approval of its pain and pleasure from the impartial self.   
 
Through the process self-approval, the agent attains integrity.  The current action is integral of the 
grand optimizing plan of the agent as current self moderates the pitch of its excitement.  Such a 
view of the complex self provides a mechanism to abridge the decision-action gap without the 
appeal to self-punishment or “police society.”   
 
Such a theory of the complex self opens new vistas of research.  This cannot be elaborated here 
[Khalil, 2003].  But it suffices to emphasize that the view of the propriety mechanism as constructed 
daily, as the self attempts to maintain integrity, promises to supersedes the shortcomings of 
modelling self-integrity as a strategy to avoid punishment, as a taste, and as a character trait in 
evolutionary game. 
 
7.   IMPLICATIONS 
The dominant view regards weakness of will an anomaly facing the standard theory of rationality.  
The paper argues the opposite:  The fact that weakness of will is not widespread is the anomaly.  
In a simple model, the paper shows that weakness of will is the dominant strategy in a game 
between current self and future self.  This leads to the motivating question of the paper:  Why is 
weakness of will is not pervasive—given that precommitment and punishment are not sufficiently 
pervasive to remedy the weakness of will?  The paper argues that the answer lies in what Adam 
Smith calls the “propriety” mechanism:  Humans demand self-respect and, hence, exercise self-
command over appetites and emotions. 
  
The above analysis has many implications.  First, is there a neural support to the hypothesis of 
propriety as the mechanism that abridges the decision-action gap?  To wit, one neuroscientist, 
Michael Gazzaniga [1998, Gazzaniga et al., 1998], argues that the brain has an operator, the 
“judge,” that differs from the actor, the “doer.”  As a judge, the self is constantly evaluating the 
propriety of action.  The integrated or healthy self primarily wants to make sure that the agent 
today is not hurting the agent tomorrow. 
  
Second, the above analysis of self-command has been carried out with little reference to social 
interaction, the preferences of others, or even society.  It is currently faddish among economists to 
introduce social interaction á la Gary Becker [1996] or even discuss “prosocial” preferences [Gintis 
et al., 2005].  While social reference point influences the formation of self-command, the social 
group is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition.  One can model the agent as caring about 
his future self without invoking the preference of the social group.  
  13  
Third, there is additional error when integrity or trust is lumped in the category of “prosocial” 
preferences.  The fact that trust connotes some moral dimension, stemming from the preservation 
of integrity, does not mean automatically that it is a prosocial preference.  One can think of altruism 
in the sense of charity as a prosocial preference.  But trust or integrity is rooted in self-interest 
calculation, i.e., the protection of property either in the sense of justice or prudence.  Trust has 
always been troubling to thinkers.  On one hand, social contract theorists to David Hume [1751, 
1896] and Richard Posner [1994] argue that property and trust is rooted in interest [see Khalil, 
2005].  On the other hand, trust cannot be simply synonymous with interest—otherwise loafing and 
distrust would be widespread.  Trust captures self-integrity.  The simple model advanced here 
captures the double faces of trust: interest and integrity.  The decision about property is rooted in 
interest, while the action to over-ride the dominant strategy of cheating expresses integrity. 
  
Fourth, how could the agent close the decision-action gap if the decision is unknowable?  The 
agent may not be too sure of whether his failure to execute a plan is the result of temptation or the 
result of over-evaluating his ability.  If the agent over-evaluated his ability, and hence mistakenly 
decided on non-realistic goals the action may fall behind the decision for reasons other than 
weakness of will.  This area of ambiguity is the source of much anxiety and turmoil, which is 
outside the scope of the paper.  
  
Fifth, what is the relation between rationality and the emotions?  Common wisdom for many 
centuries, as well as the wisdom of the man-on-the-street, is that one should control one’s 
emotions for his own interest [Elster, 1999].  In fact, the opposition between reason and the 
emotions can be traced to Plato.  However, a new line of thinking has flourished to demolish the 
dichotomy between reason and the emotions.  As articulated by Jack Hirschleifer [1987] and 
Robert Frank [1988], natural selection has favoured agents who react emotionally in order to make 
credible threats against aggression:  It is rational to be irrational and emotional so that aggressors 
do not think that the agent does not care about sunk cost.  I call this argument “the invisible hand 
of the emotions.”  In this light, the set of emotions is the daughter of rationality:  Even if natural 
selection did not select the over-reaction, the rational agent should demonstrate emotional over-
reaction to scare others. 
 
However, this argument entails that the emotions are socially dependent.  One needs to live in 
society to have emotions and appetites.  A Robinson Crusoe, who does not deal with any creature 
that understands his emotions, cannot employ emotions in the world of Hirschleifer and Frank. So, 
the emotions are society-dependent phenomena.  But what about appetites related to the 
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phenomena? 
 
To answer the question, we need to understand the emotions as appetites and sentiments which 
are not society-dependent.  Adam Smith, in his Theory of Moral Sentiments, understood them as 
such.  He did so remarkably without opposing reason and the emotions.  The way Smith reconciled 
reason and the emotions is by modelling “reason” as simply the emotions or sympathy of the 
distant self, whom he called the “impartial spectator.  So, for Smith, the emotions of the impartial 
spectator masquerade themselves as reason, while the emotions of the current self are the 
emotions proper. 
 
Sixth, punishment, precommitment, and other forms of “police society” may crowd out propriety as 
the mechanism for abridging the decision-action gap.  For instance, Richard Thaler and Cass 
Sunstein [2003] propose that libertarian paternalism, where the state solves the weakness of will 
with regard to saving, is not an oxymoronic concept.  They might be correct.  The point is rather 
whether the crowding out of propriety by precommitment can be expensive in the long run in terms 
of administrative cost.  It might be more efficient to enact policies that nurture the growth of 
propriety—even though such policies may not have immediate results. 
  
There are many other implications of the analysis of weakness of will.  Weakness of will, as shown 
here, is not an anomaly in the temple of standard theory of rationality.  What is anomalous in the 
temple is the absence of the widespread of weakness of will.  This absence cannot be explained 
by the appeal to punishment, precommitment, or the “police society.”  One can only understand the 
absence by a careful physiology of the complex self.  The physiology of the self should prove to be 
the next big challenge facing economics and social theory in general. 
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